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OFACI: HANDS OFF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
Keith Stolte*
INTRODUCTION
For over a decade, the United States government has demon-
strated an enormous interest in strengthening international
intellectual property rights.2 Since 1986, the federal government
has initiated numerous programs, backed by wide-ranging legisla-
tion and administrative rules, to combat trademark, patent and
copyright infringement within this country and abroad.3 This
'Office of Foreign Assets Control.
* Intellectual Property Administrator, Win. Wrigley Jr. Co. The author would like to
thank Professor Doris Long of John Marshall Law School, Chicago and Laurel Adamsen, for-
merly of the International Trademark Association, for their assistance in the preparation of
this Article.
2See, e.g., NATIONAL SEC. AND INT'L AFFAIRS DIv., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: STRENGTHENING WORLDWIDE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, 3 (1987) [hereinafter GAO Rep.] (focusing on the urgent need for
international reforms in patent, trademark, and copyright protection and enforcement
policies); see generally Monique L. Cordray, GA7T v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOCY 121 (1994) (discussing the relative advantages afforded by the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) over the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention)); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO
Agreement, 29 INTL LAW. 345 (1995) (exploring the substantial interest of the United States
government in establishing basic intellectual property protection in foreign countries).
3 In 1986, the Reagan administration highlighted the need of the U.S. government to get
tough on countries that fail to effectively protect intellectual property rights. GAO Rep.,
supra note 2, at 35-37; Cordray, supra note 2, at 124; Oswald Johnston, U.S. Taking a Hard
Line On Counterfeiters - Unveils Program to Protect American Products, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1986, at B4. To demonstrate its firm commitment to stronger international protection and
enforcement, the federal government initiated an international dialogue which ultimately
resulted in the development and adoption of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement by scores of countries. See Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 365; 33 IL.M. 81 (1994); see also
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 101(dX15), 108 Stat. 4809, 4814
(1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3511) (authorizing President Clinton to sign the TRIPS
Agreement). See also Reichman, supra note 2, at 381-85 (discussing the U.S. government's
intense interest in the TRIPS negotiations). More recently, the Clinton Administration has
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noteworthy commitment is bolstered by an extraordinary degree of
cooperation between numerous federal departments, Congress and
industry leaders. Among the most prominent agencies engaged in
the war against international intellectual property abuse are the
U.S. Customs Service, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Department of State and the International Trade Commission.'
Given the strong support of the U.S. government in general, and
various executive departments and agencies in particular, to
strengthening world wide intellectual property protections, it is
ironic that one federal agency, the Office of Foreign Asset Control
(OFAC), appears to be swimming against the tide.' OFAC is the
agency responsible for regulating and administering U.S. embargo
actions against countries that pose foreign policy or national
security problems for the United States. In recent years, OFAC
has demonstrated an irresponsible disregard for the concerns and
rights of intellectual property owners.'
For instance, OFAC regulations in two recent embargo ac-
tions-one directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
another against Cuba-made it difficult, if not practically impossi-
ble, for U.S. trademark, patent and copyright owners to effectively
forcefully challenged the Peoples Republic of China to promulgate effective intellectual
property legislation and to substantially step up its historically deplorable enforcement
practices. U.S. Sets Deadlines for China Regarding I.P. Compliance, 10 World Intell. Prop.
Rep. (BNA) No. 1, at 6-7 (Jan. 1996).
" For example, Congress has vested the U.S. Customs Service with broad powers to seize
foreign imports that infringe U.S. protected trademarks and copyrights. Trademark Act of
1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994); Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1994); Trade-
marks, Tradenames, and Copyrights, 19 C.F.R. § 133 (1996). For an extensive discussion of
the Customs Service's role in combatting international trademark infringement, see Keith
Stolte, Note, If it Walks Like a Duck: A Proposal to Unify U.S. Customs' Treatment of
Infringing Imports, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 711 (1996). The U.S. Trade Representative
possesses broad powers to punish countries that fail to provide adequate and effective
protection to U.S. owners of intellectual property assets. Trade Act of 1974, § 301, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2411 (1994). For a discussion of the growing involvement of the International Trade
Commission in protecting intellectual property rights, and especially patent rights, see
Donna M. Tanguay and Mark G. Davis, The Landmark Cases of the ITC, MANAGING INTELL.
PROP., May 1995, at 45.
5 See infra notes 51-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of OFAC's recent unusual
tendency to limit the rights of U.S. intellectual property assets in certain embargo-targeted
countries.
" See infra Part H for a discussion of the impact of OFAC regulations on American
intellectual property rights in embargoed countries.
[Vol. 4:25
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protect their assets in those countries.7 It is time that OFAC falls
into step with the rest of the federal government in combatting
foreign counterfeiters and infringers.
This Article will stress the importance of ensuring that OFAC
administers U.S. embargo actions in a manner commensurate with
U.S. policies relating to the strengthening of international intellec-
tual property rights abroad. Part I will examine the history and
organization of OFAC and the policy bases of foreign embargoes.
Part II will discuss how OFAC regulations have traditionally
avoided restrictions on intellectual property transactions and how
more recent OFAC embargoes have eliminated this general
exemption. Finally, Part III of this article will focus on the strong
governmental interest in refraining from any kind of OFAC-
imposed restrictions against the protection of patents, trademarks
and copyrights, especially in embargoed countries.
I. THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET CONTROL
OFAC, an agency of the Department of the Treasury, is generally
responsible for administering embargoes and economic sanctions
against foreign countries that adversely affect the economic or
national security concerns of the United States.' The United
States has, over the past two decades, imposed embargo actions or
maintained previously imposed embargoes against numerous
countries including Angola, Cambodia, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait,
Libya, Nicaragua, North Korea, Panama, Rhodesia, South Africa,
Vietnam and Yugoslavia.9 Generally, OFAC-administered embar-
goes are imposed against rogue countries that support or tolerate
international terrorism, engage in unfair or damaging economic
abuses, violate internationally recognized human rights standards
or pose a military or national security risk to the United States or
7 See infra notes 49-75 and accompanying text for a discussion of how OFAC regulations
with respect to the U.S. embargo actions against Yugoslavia and Cuba had damaging
consequences for U.S. owners of intellectual property rights.
' See R. Richard Newcomb, Coping with U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WiTH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 1995 at 169, 173-74 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 733, 1995).
9d. at 173, 182-90.
1996] OFAC
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its allies.1" This Part will examine the history and policies behind
OFAC and U.S. embargo actions. In particular, this Part will focus
on congressionally delegated authority for such actions and on
OFAC's administrative procedures in carrying out foreign embar-
goes and economic sanctions.
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. EMBARGO POLICY
The major purpose of embargoes and other economic sanctions is
to prevent targeted countries, or citizens and companies of such
countries, from benefiting from foreign exchange payments by U.S.
nationals. Specifically, the federal government imposes embargo
measures or other sanctions to prevent transactions involving the
transfer of U.S. capital, goods, technology and services to targeted
countries. Sometimes the purpose of an embargo or sanction is to
protect the assets of a country, such as when another country has
invaded the target country or when an illegitimate regime has
taken control of the target country's government. For example, the
United States conducted this protective type of asset freezing
against Panama in 1988 and against Kuwait in 1990. Other times,
the government may impose an embargo for purely punitive
purposes. Examples of embargoes imposed to punish countries, or
to encourage internal reform include those conducted against North
Korea since 1950, and against Cuba since 1963.
The President's broad authority to impose economic embargoes
against recalcitrant foreign countries principally derives from (1)
the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA)11 and (2) the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).12 Both of these
laws empower the President to adopt rules and regulations which
serve to prohibit or limit commercial or economic transactions by
U.S. nationals in specified countries.13 In addition, under the
'0 Id. at 173, 191-95.
" 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994).
L2 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994).
L' See, e.g., TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b). The relevant section of the TWEA provides the
President with the following authority:
(1) During time of war, the President may, through any agency that he
may designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may
prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise-
[Vol. 4:25
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United Nations Participation Act (UNPA),14 Congress has autho-
rized the President to implement embargo measures adopted by the
U.N. Security Council pursuant to Article 41 of the U.N. Char-
ter.15 Additional statutory authority for foreign embargo actions
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit any transactions in
foreign exchange, transfers of credit or payments between, by,
through, or to any banking institution, and the importing,
exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or silver
coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void,
prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use,
transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exporta-
tion of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any
property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has
any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and any
property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof
shall vest, when, as, and upon the terms, directed by the
President, in such agency or person as may be designated from
time to time by the President, and upon such terms and
conditions as the President may prescribe such interest or
property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or
otherwise dealt with in the interest of and for the benefit of the
United States, and such designated agency or person may
perform any and all acts incident to the accomplishment or
furtherance of these purposes...
(2) Any payment, conveyance, transfer, assignment, or delivery of
property or interest therein, made to or for the account of the United
States, or as otherwise directed, pursuant to this subsection or any rule,
regulation, instruction, or direction issued hereunder shall to the extent
thereof be a full acquittance and discharge for all purposes of the
obligation of the person making same; and no person shall be held liable
in any court for or in respect to anything done or omitted in good faith
in connection with the administration of, or in pursuance of and in
reliance on, this subdivision, or any rule, regulation, instruction, or
direction issued hereunder.
Id.
1 4 United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(c) (1994).
15 U.N. CHARTER art. 41. Article 41 authorizes the U.N.'s Security Council to impose
various forms of non-military sanctions in order to maintain or restore international peace.
Specifically, Article 41 provides:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use
of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it
may call upon Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
5
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derives from the International Security Development and Coopera-
tion Act (ISDCA) and other legislation that targets specific
countries. 6
Executive authority to impose economic sanctions against U.S.
nationals who engage in commerce with disfavored foreign
countries originated out of World War I, when Congress enacted
the TWEA.'7 Congress intended the TWEA to severely limit U.S.
trade with Germany and other Axis powers as a means to destabil-
ize these countries' economies."8 At the time of enactment, the
TWEA authorized the President to regulate U.S. trade with any
perceived enemy. In 1977, Congress amended the TWEA, giving the
President authority to invoke the broad TWEA powers only during
times of war.'9
To compensate for this limitation, Congress also enacted the
IEEPA in 1977 which authorizes the President to impose economic
sanctions against designated countries. These sanctions include
freezing assets of such countries under the jurisdiction of the
United States, prohibiting U.S. citizens and companies from
engaging in various financial transactions with designated
countries or nationals of designated countries and other actions
intended to pressure target countries to cease or moderate their
Id.
6 International Security and Development Cooperation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa (1994).
Congress intended ISDCA to target especially those countries that support terrorism. Id.
Examples of legislation which authorizes embargo measures and otherwise targets specific
countries include the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA), 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5083
(repealed 1994) and the Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994). The CAAA,
for instance, authorized the President to ban certain types of imports from South Africa and
also prohibited loans and other types of investment in South Africa. 22 U.S.C. § 5001.
1 Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1994)). Specifically, the TWEA prohibited U.S. citizens or companies
to trade, or attempt to trade, either directly or indirectly, ... with
knowledge or reasonable cause to believe... [that the trading partner]
is an enemy or ally of an enemy, or is conducting or taking part in such
trade... for or on account of, or on behalf of, or for the benefit of... an
enemy.
50 U.S.C. app. § 3(a).
" See Marielise Kelly, Artwork From 'Enemy" Nations: Informational Material Under
the Trading With the Enemy Act, A Relic of the Perceived Communist Threat, 14 SUFFOLK
TRANSNATL L.J. 567, 569-71 (1991).
" 50 U.S.C. app. 5(bX1). See Kelly, supra note 18, at 570 (discussing the limitation of the
President's powers to those times when the United States is at war with an enemy).
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objectionable policies or conduct.20  Most foreign embargoes
administered under OFAC regulations are imposed under the
auspices of the IEEPA, since most embargoes are imposed against
nations with which the United States is not at war. Embargoes
under the IEEPA may take various forms. Some embargoes are
selective in nature-for example, prohibiting only certain types of
imports from a target country.21 Other embargoes are comprehen-
sive, prohibiting most economic transactions with a designated
country or its nationals.22
Congress authorized the President, and indirectly OFAC, to
exercise a great deal of discretion in the imposition and execution
of embargo measures and other types of economic sanctions.'
This high level of discretion is generally justified, largely because
embargoes are imposed against specific countries under unique sets
of facts and circumstances and with diverse foreign policy and
national security goals in mind.24 Therefore, while most OFAC-
administered embargoes are substantially similar in form and
substance, each program is administered on a country by country
basis, each with unique program elements.' The following
section will briefly outline how OFAC typically regulates embargo
actions and other economic sanctions against rogue countries.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES OF THE OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSET
CONTROL
Since its creation, OFAC has wielded an expansive range of
powers against scores of countries.26 In fact, OFAC is one of the
20 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994). See Newcomb, supra note 8, at 180-81.
" Id. An example of an embargo which sought to limit only selective transactions such
as particular types of export commodities was the OFAC administered embargo against
South Africa during the 1980's and early 1990's. See 22 U.S.C. § 5001 (repealed 1994).
2 See Newcomb, supra note 8, at 180-81. The U.S. embargoes against Cuba and North
Korea are examples of comprehensive embargo schemes. See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act,
22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6010 (1994).
23 See, e.g., TWEA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5; IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1706.
' R. Richard Newcomb, Economic Sanctions and Embargoes--Foreign Asset Control
Programs, C399 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 211, 214-15
(Nov. 10, 1989).
25 d. at 215.
'2 OFAC was created shortly before the United States entered the Second World War,
particularly in response to the German invasion of Norway and Denmark. Newcomb, supra
note 24, at 214. OFAC froze all Norwegian and Danish assets under the jurisdiction of the
1996] OFAC
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most powerful and feared agencies of the federal government.27
OFAC has significant powers in formulating and promulgating
national security and foreign affairs policy, enforcement activities
and regulations.' Specifically, OFAC's principal responsibilities
include:
(1) promulgating embargo regulations, (2) issuing
licenses and interpretive administrative rulings, (3)
monitoring blocked assets, (4) ensuring that its
regulations comply with statutory, executive and
regulatory requirements, (5) coordinating and con-
ducting investigations of violations, (6) imposing civil
fines for embargo violations, (7) referring cases of
violations for criminal prosecution, and (8) providing
training, technical and legal support to other federal
agencies involved in related activities. 29
Because of the agency's wide latitude of discretion, OFAC
regulations can vary considerably within their scope and reach.'
Embargo regulations against certain countries, such as Cuba and
North Korea,31 may be comprehensive, prohibiting almost all
financial or commercial transactions regardless of where the
United States in order to prohibit a German controlled repatriation of these assets. Id.
After the forced incorporation of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia into the Soviet Union, OFAC
froze the U.S. assets of the three Baltic nations. Id. Throughout the Second World War,
OFAC imposed economic sanctions, including freezing assets, against all Axis powers. Id.
Later, OFAC implemented embargo measures against China and North Korea (1950), Cuba
(1963), Vietnam (1964), Rhodesia (1965), Cambodia (1975), Iran (1979), Nicaragua (1985),
South Africa (1985), Libya (1986), Panama (1988), Kuwait (1990), Yugoslavia (1993). Id. In
addition, in 1953, OFAC placed certain restrictions on U.S. citizens and companies to finance
and export certain types of strategic materials to Eastern Bloc countries. Newcomb, supra
note 24, at 214.
2 In addition to its powers to impose stiff civil penalties against violators of its
regulations, OFAC can initiate criminal prosecutions, leading to even greater fines and
imprisonment. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1994).
28 Newcomb, supra note 8, at 177-78.
29 Id.
o Cecil Hunt & Evan R. Berlack, Overview of U.S. Export Controls, in COPING WITH U.S.
ExPoRT CoNmOS 1995, at 27, 52-53 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 733, 1995).
31 Other countries which are presently subject to a comprehensive embargo include Iran,
Iraq, and Libya.
[Vol. 4:25
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transactions take place, while OFAC regulations against other
countries are tailored to particular transactions, such as specific
financial dealings or export commodities. 2 Complicating matters
is the fact that many of OFAC's regulations, while fairly detailed,
are deliberately vague, allowing OFAC room to maneuver, depend-
ing on particular fact situations.3
Under most embargo actions, OFAC regulations allow for some
types of financial or commercial transactions, even with respect to
countries subject to a comprehensive embargo.' But these
transactions, in every case, must somehow be authorized by
OFAC.' Such authorization is usually made through a licensing
scheme. Essentially, OFAC issues licenses in two forms: (1) a
general license, the text of which is incorporated into specific OFAC
regulations as published in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR),
and (2) a specific license, which OFAC may grant on a case by case
request.m
General licenses typically authorize a certain type of transaction
which is specified in the CFR section. 7 Sometimes general
licenses may be subject to particularized conditions or prerequi-
sites, but assuming these are met, a company or individual is
authorized to freely engage in the transaction with no further
permission from OFAC.38 Specific licenses, on the other hand,
require in each case a written application to execute transactions
that otherwise would be prohibited by OFAC regulations. 9
Absent either type of license, virtually all commercial or financial
transactions are prohibited with those countries that are subject to
32 Hunt, supra note 30, at 53.
'Id. For example, the phrase "property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States"
is intentionally vague, allowing OFAC a very broad basis of interpretation. Id, This phrase,
which is used repeatedly in scores of OFAC regulatory sections, is left undefined.
For example, most embargoes permit charitable transactions that involve the provision
of necessary food supplies and medicines.
"Symposium, Are the U.S. Treaswury's Assets Control Reguklons a Fair and Effective
Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy? The Case of Cuba, 79 AM. SoC'Y INTVL L. PROC. 169, 175 (1985)
[hereinafter Cuba] (remarks of Dennis M. O'Connell, former Director of Office of Foreign
Assets Control).
Id.
7Id; OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 500.317 (1996).
"8 See Cuba, supra note 35, at 175.
9OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 500.318 (1996).
OFAC1996]
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a comprehensive embargo.' Violators of embargo restrictions
may face serious consequences.
Violations of OFAC regulations can lead to significant penalties.
Corporate criminal penalties range up to $1 million, and individu-
als may face up to $100,000 in criminal fines and may be impris-
oned for as many as ten years.41 In addition, OFAC may adminis-
tratively impose a civil fine in an amount up to $50,000 for each
infraction of its regulations.42
Because the enabling legislation discussed above in Section A
grants broad discretion to the President, and through him, to OFAC
itself, federal courts typically defer to OFAC's regulatory and
enforcement activities."3 Under ordinary circumstances, such
broad discretion in the hands of OFAC and the correspondingly
high level of judicial deference would be understandable. But
when, as recently, it appears that OFAC frequently employs bad
judgement, abuses its broad level of discretion and becomes
practically unaccountable to any higher executive authority, it is
time that Executive, Congressional and Judicial authorities take notice.
44
40 Id.; see Cuba, supra note 35, at 175.
1 See 50 U.S.C. app. § 16 (1994).
42ld.
' De Cuellar v. Brady, 881 F.2d 1561, 1565 (1lth Cir. 1989) (stating that OFAC decisions
are entitled to a great amount of deference and should be reviewed only under an arbitrary
and capricious standard); see also Consarc Corp. v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 71 F.3d
909, 915 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating OFACs interpretation of a regulation receives a greater
degree of deference and "must prevail unless plainly inconsistent7); Milena Ship Management
Co. v. Newcomb, 995 F.2d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding an OFAC presumption to be
reasonable under circumstances).
"Recent events reported in official government reports and the public press have
severely criticized OFAC and its director. See 140 CONG. REC. H2853 (daily ed. Apr. 28,
1994) (statement of Rep. Doug Bereuter of Nebraska that OFAC is an "apparently
unaccountable agency"); see also Treasury Official's Meetings Probed, GREENSBORO NEWS &
REC., May 11, 1996 at B6; Treasury Agent Reprimanded Over Meetings, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, May 11, 1996, at B5. The Treasury Department's Inspector General
investigated 11 cases involving questionable behavior by the director of OFAC based on a
series of news reports by the Associated Press in 1994 and 1995. John Solomon, Treasury
Official Found to Have Met with Probe Subjects Outside Office, Assoc. PRESS, May 10, 1996.
In addition, several OFAC employees made allegations that partly prompted the Inspector
General's investigation. Id. Instances of questionable conduct included improper ex parte
meetings with investigation subjects, acceptance of gifts, potential conflicts of interest, and
damaging "leaks" of information that may have compromised OFAC and Justice Department
investigations. Id.; Greg Hitt, Treasury Official Says He Never Undermined Arab Bank
Probe, CAP. MARKETS REP., June 12,1996; Libyan Laundering Probe Compromised, Officials
[Vol. 4:25
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II. OFAC EMBARGO MEASURES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
Traditionally, OFAC regulations have granted a general license
for the payment of all fees necessary to obtain and maintain
intellectual property protection in embargoed countries. In recent
years, however, OFAC and its Director have taken steps tending to
limit the exemption of intellectual property transactions. This
trend ffies in the face of the intense efforts the U.S. government
has made to shore up worldwide intellectual property protection.
A. TRADITIONAL EXEMPTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
TRANSACTIONS
Since their inception, and until recently, all OFAC embargo
regulations have included a general license for intellectual property
transactions." Throughout the duration of the embargo sanctions
Say, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 23, 1996, at AS. According to OFAC internal
documents, OFAC's director allegedly entertained a proposal to abduct Marc Rich, a
billionaire fugitive in Switzerland, and return him to the United States to stand trial for
various tax evasion and fraud charges and for violations of the Iranian embargo. Greg Hitt,
Bond, Treasury Bond: Top Agency Enforcer Mulled a Kidnapping-Plot to Nab Fugitive
Marc Rich Left Colleagues Shaken, Not Stirred to Act, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1996, at A6.
The plan called for OFAC to pay $1 million to private bounty hunters to kidnap Mr. Rich,
whom the Swiss Government has protected, despite numerous efforts of the U.S. government
to have him extradited, and bodily return him to the United States. Id. During a July 1992
meeting, various OFAC staff members considered the kidnapping proposal by a former
official of the Nixon Justice Department. Id. See also John Solomon, Treasury Agency
Entertained Plan to Kidnap Fugitive, Assoc. PRESS, June 12, 1996. Alarmed by the surge
of allegations of misconduct, the Chairman of a House Banking Subcommittee recently
ordered the General Accounting Office to conduct its own investigation of OFAC and its
director. Greg Hitt, GAO, Spurred by Congress, To Probe Treasury's Newcomb, Dow JONES
INTL NEWS SERV., June 13, 1996; see also John Solomon, Pan Am 103 Families Want
Treasury Official Ousted, ASSOC. PRESS, June 13, 1996. For a thorough discussion of the
litany of possible OFAC misconduct, see Benjamin Weiser, Sanctions Czar: Big Gun or Loose
Cannon?: R. Richard Newcombe Inspires Respect, Anger; Few are Neutral on Sanctions Czar
Newcombe, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1996, at H1.
' See, eg., OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 500.528 (1996). This section covers the general
license for U.S. citizens or companies to engage in intellectual property transactions as they
relate to the ongoing embargoes against North Korea, Cambodia, and Vietnam:
Certain transactions with respect to blocked foreign patents, trademarks
and copyrights authorized.
(a) The following transactions by any person who is not a designated
national are hereby authorized:
(1) The filing and prosecution of any application for a blocked foreign
11
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against North Korea (since 1950), Vietnam (since 1964) and Iran
(since 1979), direct and indirect payments for official fees and
services for the protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights
have been authorized by virtue of general licenses."
The long-standing policy of the U.S. government to exempt
intellectual property payments from the class of prohibited
transactions clearly manifests the importance which the govern-
ment has placed on protecting these types of assets. In granting
general licenses for intellectual property payments, the federal
government has, until recently, consistently struck the proper
balance between the benefits and burdens of allowing these types
of currency payments to be paid to the governments and nationals
of embargoed nations.47
In most countries, patent, trademark and copyright protections
are solely dependent upon the granting or registration of these
rights by the respective government." The practical inability of
U.S. companies to file applications for patent, trademark or
copyright protection, or to pay periodic fees required for the
patent, trademark or copyright, or for the renewal thereof;
(2) The receipt of any blocked foreign patent, trademark or copyright;
(3) The filing and prosecution of opposition or infringement proceedings
with respect to any blocked foreign patent, trademark or copyright, and
the prosecution of a defense to any such proceedings;
(4) The payment of fees currently due to the government of any foreign
country, either directly or through an attorney or representative, in
connection with any of the transactions authorized by paragraphs (aX1),
(2) and (3) of this section or for the maintenance of any blocked foreign
patent, trademark or copyright; and
(5) The payment of reasonable and customary fees currently due to
attorneys or representatives in any foreign country incurred in connec-
tion with any of the transactions authorized by paragraphs (aX1), (2), (3)
or (4) of this section.
31 C.F.R. § 500.528. See also OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. §§ 535.528 & 560.509 (dealing with the
embargo against Iran); OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 565.503 (1993) (relating to the embargo
action against Panama).
Similarly, OFAC has traditionally also granted a general license for intellectual property
transactions to nationals of embargo-targeted countries. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 500.527 (1996).
' Letter from Robin A. Rolfe, Executive Director, International Trademark Association,
to the Honorable Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury 1 (Aug. 8, 1995) (on file with
the International Trademark Association and with the author).
47 Id
48 See la JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 9.02, 9-2 to 9-5
(1996).
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maintenance of these assets, will inevitably lead to their failure to
obtain or maintain important rights.49 Thus, the federal govern-
ment has traditionally and wisely refused to prohibit U.S. citizens
and companies from being able to protect their intellectual property
assets, even in countries with which the government has foreign
policy or national security concerns. Essentially, the government
had, in the past, found that the benefit of protecting U.S. trade-
marks, copyrights and technology in embargoed countries greatly
outweighed the government's foreign policy interest in denying
hard currency to such nations.'
B. RECENT OFAC REGULATIONS HAVE LIMITED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS
Despite the government's long-standing policy to exempt
intellectual property payments from embargo restrictions, in 1993
OFAC promulgated the Yugoslavia embargo regulations with a
severe limitation on patent, trademark and copyright transac-
tions.51 Instead of granting a general license for intellectual
property transactions, as was always done in past embargoes,
OFAC required all patent, trademark and copyright related official
fees to be paid to a blocked account in a U.S. bank, presumably for
the post-embargo benefit of the government of Yugoslavia.52
' Of course, the same could be said for the inability of a U.S. company to initiate,
prosecute or defend against infringement actions, generally heard before a court.
60 No one has ever suggested that any embargoed country has ever attempted to exploit
intellectual property transactional payments as a means of earning hard currency or
avoiding U.S. imposed embargoes.
51 OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 585.515 (1994). In 1992, the U.S. government attempted to
pressure the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into ceasing hostilities
against its neighbors, including Bosnia and certain sections of Croatia. Pursuant to
Executive orders No. 12808, issued by President Bush on May 30, 1992, 3 C.F.R. 305 (1993),
and No. 12810, issued on June 5, 1992, 3 C.F.R. 307 (1993), the federal government
prohibited U.S. companies, individuals and Yugoslavian subsidiaries of U.S. companies from
either directly or indirectly transferring funds to the Yugoslavian government or to its
nationals located in Yugoslavia. On March 10, 1993, OFAC Director Richard Newcomb
issued the Yugoslavian sanction regulations. Federal Republic of Yogoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and Bosnian Serb-countrolled Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzovina
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 585 (1995).
52 OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 585.515. The OFAC regulations incorporated most of the
language of previous embargo regulations, see, e.g., 31 C.F.R. 500.528 (1994) (discussing
transactions concerning patents, trademarks, and copyrights), with a few crucial differences.
Section 585.515 reads, in part, as follows:
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In addition, OFAC prohibited the payment of any service fees to
attorneys and other legal representatives if the attorneys or
representatives were located in Yugoslavia.' The regulations did
allow service fee payments to be made to individuals located
outside of Yugoslavia, provided that the payment of attorney's fees
did not result in the transfer of these funds to the Yugoslavian
government or individuals residing in Yugoslavia." In addition,
any payments that were made to a blocked account pursuant to the
OFAC regulations had to be reported to OFAC.'
While OFAC's regulations relating to the embargo against
Yugoslavia did not completely prohibit intellectual property
Certain transactions related to patents, trademarks and copyrights
authorized.
(a) All of the following transactions in connection with patent, trade-
mark or copyright, or other intellectual property protection in the United
States or the FRY (S&M) [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] are autho-
rized.
(1) The filing and prosecution of any application for a patent, trademark
or copyright, or for the renewal thereof;
(2) The receipt of any patent, trademark or copyright; and
(3) The filing and prosecution of opposition or infringement proceedings
with respect to any patent, trademark or copyright, and the prosecution
of a defense to any such proceeding.
(b) The payment of reasonable and customary fees currently due to the
United States Government or to attorneys or representatives within the
United States in connection with any transaction authorized by
paragraphs (aXl)-(3) of this section may be made from a blocked account
held in the name of the entity in the FRY (S&M) holding the patent,
trademark or copyright.
(c) The payment of fees currently due to the Government of the FRY
(S&M) directly or through an attorney or representative, in connection
with any of the transactions authorized by paragraphs (aX1)-(3) of this
section, or for the maintenance of any patent, trademark or copyright,
must be made into a blocked account in a domestic U.S. financial
institution in the name of the appropriate governmental entity. In
addition, fees currently due to individual attorneys or representatives in
the FRY (S&M) in connection with any of the transactions authorized by
paragraphs (a)(1)-(3) of this section may not be transferred to the FRY...
[but may be paid to entities located outside the FRY (S&M)].
31 C.F.R. § 585.515 (emphasis supplied).
53 31 C.F.R. § 585.515(c). It stands to reason that, at the time of the U.S. embargo action
against Yugoslavia, most attorneys licensed to practice trademark, patent or copyright law
in Yugoslavia resided in Yugoslavia.
54 OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 585.523 (1994).
5 31 C.F.R. § 585.515(d).
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transactions, they severely limited the means that U.S. companies
had at their disposal to protect their patents, trademarks and
copyrights. First, at the time OFAC issued its regulations in
March 1993, there was absolutely no reason to expect the Yugo-
slavian Government to accept official fees paid to a blocked account
in a U.S. bank.w As it happens, the Yugoslavian Government
appears to have accepted some of these payments. But OFAC's
unjustified presumption that this would be the case could have put
countless companies' intellectual property assets in jeopardy if this
presumption turned out to be false.
Second, since OFAC regulations prohibited any payment of
attorney fees for patent, trademark and copyright matters to
anyone in Yugoslavia, U.S. companies had to scramble to find duly
licensed attorneys located outside Yugoslavia to conduct intellectual
property work in Yugoslavia.57 Assuming that a U.S. company
was successful in securing the legal services of an attorney located
outside Yugoslavia who could represent its interests before the
Yugoslavian Patent and Trademark Office or its law courts, the
additional costs associated with this inconvenience (e.g., travel and
additional communication expenses) could be burdensome, if not
prohibitive, for some companies.
In promulgating the Yugoslavia sanction regulations, OFAC was
entirely silent as to why it did not grant a general license for
intellectual property transactions." Nor did OFAC make any
special announcement indicating the foreign policy or national
security basis for breaking with its long standing policy to grant
such a license.59 In fact, there is no authority at all which ex-
plains OFAC's action in limiting the rights of U.S. intellectual
property owners in Yugoslavia. One can only conclude that some
official at OFAC was so overzealous in punishing or pressuring the
Yugoslavian government, that he or she entirely lost sight of the
acknowledged benefits of granting the traditional general license
for intellectual property transactions.
OFAC's limitation of the exemption for intellectual property
58 31 C.F.R. § 585.515(c).
67 31 C.F.R. §§ 585.515(c), 585.523.
M See 31 C.F.R. 585 (1995); 45 Fed. Reg. 13,199 (1993).
SId.
1996]
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transactions during the embargo against Yugoslavia had unwel-
come and potentially damaging, long term effects on some U.S.
businesses. At the time of the embargo, Yugoslavia was already
known to have a fair amount of intellectual property enforcement
problems.' One company found so many counterfeit or infringing
products in the Yugoslavian market, that it was forced to file more
than thirty trademark infringement suits between 1992 and
1995.1 By making it more difficult for U.S. companies to protect
their patent, trademark and copyright assets during the embargo,
OFAC may have unwittingly assisted the growth of intellectual
property abuse in Yugoslavia.
OFAC's unwise repudiation of its long standing policy of issuing
general licenses was more firmly established in August 1994, when
OFAC changed regulations to severely tighten U.S. embargo
measures against Cuba. 2 In squeezing yet more blood out of the
thirty-one year old embargo,' OFAC essentially prohibited almost
any conceivable financial or commercial transaction."
'o For example, the U.S. Trade Representative had included Yugoslavia on the "Special
301" Watch List on April 26, 1991. USTR Names China, India, Thailand as Special 301
Priority Offenders, World Intell. Prop. Rep., (BNA) Special Report, 133, 136 (May 1991). The
"Special 301" Watch List, authorized under the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994),
designates countries that tolerate suspect intellectual property practices or impose barriers
to market access. Id.
61 Zivko Mijatovic, Case Comment, F.R. Yugoslavia - Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., Trademark and
Unfair Competition, TRADEMARK WORLD, June-July 1996, at 4-7; see also Andrea Rothman,
Carousel Critters That Fetch a King's Ransom, Bus. WK., Sept 17, 1990, at 157 (discussing
Yugoslavian-made counterfeit carousel animals exported to other countries).
6 See Cuban Assets Control Regs., 59 Fed Reg. 44,884-85 (1994) (restrictions on
remittances and travel transactions). The restrictions OFAC placed on intellectual property
transactions were codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 (1995).
See generally Cuba, supra note 35 (providing a history of U.S. embargo measures
against Cuba and demonstrating various viewpoints as to the effectiveness of these
measures). After the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy imposed wide-ranging import
and export controls against Cuba in February, 1962. Id. at 169. Later, OFAC promulgated
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations in 1963. Id. See also 28 Fed Reg. 6974 (1963); 28
Fed. Reg. 7427 (1963); 28 Fed. Reg. 7941 (1963) (discussing control of financial and
commercial transactions involving Cuba or its nationals). These regulations resulted in a
comprehensive embargo against Cuba and blocked all assets of the Cuban government and
its nationals. In establishing the embargo regulations, OFAC included a general license for
intellectual property transactions. See, e.g., OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 (1984).
" Cuban Assets Control Regs., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,884-86 (1994). Essentially, OFAC revoked
almost all general licenses in effect at the time of the issuance of this final rule. These
amendments to the OFAC regulations strictly tightened the U.S. embargo against Cuba.
Pursuant to the President's announcement on August 20, 1994, the
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In the area of intellectual property regulation, OFAC canceled
the general license, which had existed since the outset of the Cuban
embargo imposed in 1 9 6 3 ." In its stead, OFAC regulations
required that all official fees for the filing, prosecution, mainte-
nance and defense of intellectual property rights had to be paid to
a blocked account in a U.S. bank." In addition, all attorney
service fees also had to be paid to a blocked account."7
By severely restricting the regulations relating to intellectual
property transactions with Cuba, OFAC once again showed a
careless disregard for the property rights of U.S. owners of patents,
trademarks and copyrights in Cuba. Again, OFAC's action
demonstrated its utter failure to appreciate that the benefits of
ensuring the adequate protection of important intellectual property
assets in Cuba far outbalanced its interest in denying the Cuban
government whatever hard U.S. currency these types of transac-
tions could provide."
Treasury Department is revoking the general authorizations permitting
cash remittances to Cuba, except to facilitate lawful immigration;
revoking the general authorizations for persons engaged in travel-related
transactions in Cuba for purposes of family visits and professional
research; and significantly restricting the general authorization
incorporating the authorization contained in the General License GIFT
... to limit the permissible contents of gift parcels eligible for exporta-
tion to Cuba to medicine, food and strictly humanitarian items.
Id. at 44,884.
"Id. at 44,885. The specific amendment to 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 restricted all payments
for intellectual property transactions in Cuba to be made to a 'blocked, interest-bearing
account at a domestic bank." 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 (1995). See also J. Sanchelima, Developing
Industrial Property Laws in Cuba, 84 TRADEMARK REP. 434 (1994) (briefly discussing
intellectual property laws in Cuba).
"31 C.F.R. § 515.528.67 1&
"' For example, one can assume that most payments of official fees for intellectual
property matters in Cuba are used to offset administrative and personnel costs of the Cuban
Patent and Trademark Office and not to line the coffers of the Castro military or economic
programs. See Letter from Robin A. Rolfe, Executive Director, International Trademark
Association, to the Honorable Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury 1-2 (Aug. 8, 1995)
(on file with the International Trademark Association and with the author).
Although there are literally billions of dollars of valuable U.S. property
rights at stake, Cuba gains a completely insignificant amount of hard
currency from trademarks payments. On a service by service basis, the
fees imposed by the Cuban government for the registration, renewal or
other servicing of trademarks are well within the normal range for other
Latin American and Caribbean countries. This is not, at least to date,
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OFAC's revocation of the general license for patent, trademark
and copyright transactions in Cuba was particularly damaging
since it was very doubtful that the Cuban government intended to
honor payments to a blocked account.6 9 The Cuban government's
lack of willingness to recognize payments to a blocked account was
understandable. Since the United States has conducted the
embargo against Cuba since 1963 and shows no signs of lifting it
anytime soon,70 the Cuban government was under no illusion that
it would see any intellectual property official fees during the next
few years. For the same reason, Cuban attorneys were also highly
unlikely to acknowledge payments for their services to a blocked
account, payments they may not see during their lifetimes.
While OFAC repudiated its long standing policy to grant or
maintain general licenses for intellectual property transactions in
its embargo regulations for Yugoslavia and Cuba, OFAC regula-
tions still allowed for the petition of special licenses for these types
of transactions. 71 The availability of special licenses for patent,
trademark or copyright fees in Yugoslavia and Cuba, however, was
generally believed to be an insufficient substitute for the general
license that OFAC traditionally granted.72  Due to excessive
an area the Cuban government has exploited to earn hard currency.
Id.
6 Request for Information - U.S. Embargo of Cuba, MEMBER BULL. (Intl Trademark
Assoc.), July 27, 1995.
7 Indeed, the Clinton Administration recently tightened the embargo restrictions against
Cuba. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
110 Stat. 785 (1996). See infra note 84 and accompanying text.71 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text for a (discussing availability of specific
licenses for transactions otherwise prohibited under OFAC regulations).
"' For example, the International Trademark Association, which represents over 3000
trademark owners, noted that the specific licensing provisions of the OFAC regulations were
not adequate to protect important trademark rights in Cuba. See Letter from Rolfe to
Secretary Rubin, supra note 68, at 2.
The OFAC licensing process is not an acceptable substitute for the
general license that was in effect without serious complaint from 1963 to
1994. Although we understand that some licenses are, in fact, being
granted, several INTA [International Trademark Association] members
have endured extended delays in receiving such licenses or are still
waiting, sometimes after several months. INTA well understands the
volume of Cuba-related license applications faced by OFAC, especially
since last August. Indeed, we understand the backlog of licenses, now
nearly 1500, is growing steadily. Despite OFAC's best efforts, the
specific license process is not providing the certain and reliable means
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delays and a huge backlog of special licensing petitions, OFAC
could not adequately assure the proper and timely payment of
official or service fees in these embargoed countries.7 3
One of the most damaging aspects of OFAC's conduct in revising
the Cuban embargo regulations was that neither OFAC nor the
Clinton Administration called much attention to the revocation of
the general license for intellectual property transactions.74
Relying on the thirty year old general license provision, persons
paying renewal fees in Cuba for famous trademarks, for instance,
after the August 1994 revision were thus unwittingly liable for civil
fines up to $50,000 for each infraction.75
Once the International Trademark Association and other
interested groups learned of OFAC's revocation of the general
license for intellectual property transactions under the Cuban
embargo, these groups lobbied OFAC and the Treasury Department
to reinstate the general license.76 Ultimately, these groups were
businesses need to protect property that is absolutely central to their
viability worldwide.
Id.
" Id. The author is aware of instances in which applications for special licenses of
various sorts were merely stuffed in a drawer and were not processed properly by OFAC staff
members.
"" See Cuban Assets Control Regs., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,884-86 (1994) (restrictions on
remittances and travel transactions). In imposing numerous restrictions in the Cuban
Embargo Regulations, OFAC's Final Rule included very detailed discussions of the new
restraints against travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens, gifts and money sent to Cuban nationals,
and other types of transactions. Id. Buried in the text of OFAC's announcement was a short
sentence relating to additional restrictions against intellectual property payments. Id. at
44,884.
"' See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing the criminal and civil
penalties for violating OFAC regulations).
6 See, e.g., Letter from Rolfe to Secretary Rubin, supra note 68; see also U.S. Embargo
of Cuba - Call for Member Action, MEMBER BULL. (Intl Trademark Assoc.), Sept. 1995. On
August 28, 1995, officials and attorneys from the International Trademark Association met
with high ranking White House, Treasury and State Department officials seeking the
reinstatement of the general license for intellectual property matters in Cuba. Id. In
response to these communications, R. Richard Newcomb, the person who revoked the general
license in the first place, stated: "The Administration is currently in the process of
reevaluating whether the foreign policy objective of denying the Government of Cuba the
hard currency earnings such payments provide is worth pursuing in light of the disadvantage
posed to U.S. businesses in protecting their intellectual property rights, also an Administra-
tion priority." Letter from R. Richard Newcomb, Director of OFAC, to Robin A. Rolfe,
Executive Director, International Trademark Association (Aug. 24, 1995) (on file with the
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successful in persuading the government that the need to adequate-
ly protect intellectual property rights of U.S. businesses in Cuba
outbalanced the Clinton Administration's foreign policy objective of
limiting the Cuban government's access to hard currency derived
from such transactions. 7 On October 20, 1995, slightly more than
a year after OFAC revoked the general license, OFAC reinstated
it. 78
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS INTEREST IN SECURING STRONG
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, ESPECIALLY IN
EMBARGOED COUNTRIES
Since at least 1985, the United States government has considered
international protection of intellectual property to be of the highest
priority.79 The federal government has demonstrated its firm
commitment to this noteworthy goal by encouraging international
accession to, and enforcement of, international treaties such as the
Paris Convention, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and especially the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(GATT/TRIPS). °  Recently, the United States has also gotten
tough with countries that fail to adopt stringent intellectual
property legislation or enforcement policies. The government's
main weapon of choice against countries with weak protection laws
International Trademark Association and with the author).
" Special Member Alert - U.S. Reinstates General License for I.P. Payments to Cuba,
MEMER BULI. (Int'l Trademark Assoc.), Oct. 19, 1995. John Reynolds of Debevoise &
Plimpton, INTA's pro bono counsel, stated,
By this decision, the Administration reaffirms the importance of
trademark right protection. The restoration of the general license for
intellectual property-related payments helps provide a certain and
reliable means of trademark protection, and reduces U.S. trademark
owners' concerns about third-party registrations
Id. Robin Rolfe, INTA's Executive director remarked, "While INTA takes no position on the
embargo as a whole, we believe companies always should have the right to protect their
trademark rights." Id.
7' OFAC Reg., 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 (1996).
See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S. government's
commitment to securing strong intellectual property protection throughout the world).
0 See generally GAO Rep., supra note 2; Corday, supra note 2; Reichman, supra note 2.
[Vol. 4:25
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or enforcement is to impose, or threaten to impose, economic
sanctions.81
The United States' commitment to strengthen patent, trademark
and copyright protection abroad is well placed. With over $200
billion in losses to the United States because of worldwide intellec-
tual property abuse, the U.S. government must maintain its efforts
to shore up protection and enforcement policies in suspect coun-
tries.82 This is particularly true for countries that are subject to
U.S. embargo actions. Most OFAC embargoes prohibit U.S.
businesses from exporting their products and services into the
target country. 83 One recent piece of legislation even goes so far
as to punish foreign companies that engage in trade with a targeted
nation.8"
While an embargo will undoubtedly severely diminish the supply
of authentic U.S. products in a target country, an embargo does
nothing to lessen the demand for these products, especially popular
"' USTR Names China a Priority Country, Takes Other I.P. Disputes to WTO, 10 World
Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 179-80 (June 1996). In its most recent threat of sanctions
against China for weak enforcement against intellectual property abuse, the U.S. government
indicated that it would impose sanctions worth over $3 billion. Id. at 180. See also Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative's Fact Sheet on Special 301 Intellectual Property Lists,
Released April 30, 1996, 10 World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 196-202 (June 1996).
The federal government has also recently relied on the World Trade Organization's (WTO)
settlement dispute opportunities provided by the TRIPS agreement to deal with countries
with less than adequate patent, trademark or copyright protection enforcement. Id.
8 Seegenerally ANTICOUNTRFrrING CONSUMER PROTECTION Acr or 1996, H.R. REP. No.
104-556 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1074 (discussing at length the enormous
economic losses to U.S. companies due to international counterfeiting). The committee found
that U.S. businesses lose $200 billion a year because of illegal counterfeiting. Id. at 2. The
committee also estimated that between 5% and 8% of all goods sold in the world are knock-
offs. Id. See also Protecting Consumers from Counterfeiting: Hearings on H.R. 2511 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, and Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
(1995) (statement of John S. Bliss, President of the International Anti-Counterfeiting
Coalition); Katharine Hull, Counterfeits -EU Acts, MANAGING INELL PROP., Jan. 1995, at
24 (indicating that the European Union Council of Ministers estimates that counterfeit goods
account for as much as 5% of total world trade and result in the loss of about 100,000 jobs
in Europe alone).
03 Newcomb, supra note 8, at 173-75.
" Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-114,
110 Stat. 785 (1996). In a direct, emotional response to the Cuban government's shooting
down of two unarmed American aircraft, President Clinton signed the so-called Helms-
Burton legislation (H.R. 927) which, among other things, allows U.S. citizens or companies
to sue foreign companies that invest or trade with Cuba. See President's Statement on
Cuban Liberty Act, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 479 (Mar. 12, 1996).
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and famous commodities such as Levi's@ jeans, Coca Cola® soda,
and Nike@ shoes.' It is an economic inevitability that the target
nation's demand for U.S. products will be satisfied through some
source'--and one probable source is the counterfeiter.
Embargoed countries are especially congenial environments for
counterfeiters and other abusers of American intellectual property.
First, a U.S.-imposed embargo guarantees that U.S. products are
unavailable, at least from the manufacturing source.8 7 Second, an
embargo, particularly a long term one, may have the intended
result of weakening or destabilizing the target country's econo-
my. 8  This development would undoubtedly have the effect of
increased unemployment and cheaper labor costs. A combination
of these factors, one can easily assume, would be a very inviting
prospect to counterfeiters or other infringers.8 9 On top of this, if
OFAC regulations make it difficult or practically impossible for
' The development of mass media, worldwide advertising and marketing by American
companies and the ever-increasing international sales of American products have vastly
enhanced consumer recognition of these products, and consequently, increased the demand
for these goods abroad.
One source could be the illegal exportation of U.S. products from the United States by
the manufacturer or a U.S. distributor. Another could be the exportation by a foreign
affiliate of the U.S. manufacturer, which would also violate OFAC regulations. Another
possible source could be an unrelated foreign distributor, one that the U.S. manufacturer
does not control in any way. See Second Annual International Business Law Symposium:
Trading with Cuba: The Cuban Democracy Act and Export Rules, 8 FLA. J. INTL L. 335, 367
(1993) (statement of Clara David discussing the general availability of Coca Cola in Cuba
and the exportation of the product from an independent Mexican bottler company).
87 Newcomb, supra note 8, at 169-175.
88 Rampant counterfeiting and other types of intellectual property abuse occur most
frequently in developing nations or in countries undergoing economic difficulties. See
generally Janet H. MacLaughlin, Timothy J. Richards & Leigh A. Kenny, The Economic
Significance of Piracy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL
CoNFICT? 89 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988); Edguardo Buscaglia
& Jose-Luis Guerrero-Cusumano, Qualitative Analysis of Counterfeiting Activities in
Developing Countries in the Pre-GA7I Period, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 221 (1995); Symposium,
Intellectual Property Protection in Asia: A Roundtable Dialogue, ECONOMIST CONF., 14-21,
(June 7-8, 1995).
See Mijatovic, supra note 61, at 4-7. During the embargo against Yugoslavia, the Win.
Wrigley Jr. Company, which was barred from selling its world renown chewing gums in
Yugoslavia, noted the wide distribution of counterfeit or infringing chewing gum products
made by numerous manufacturers. I& at 4. Consequently, the company filed more than 30
law suits against these manufacturers and their distributors. Id. See also United States v.
Zevallos, 748 F. Supp. 1569, 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (detailing a scheme to manufacture and
distribute counterfeit Winston cigarettes in Cuba).
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U.S. companies to protect their intellectual property rights in
embargoed countries, the consequences can be devastating.
Counterfeiters and other infringers of U.S. trademarks, patents and
copyrights would then be able to produce knock-offs of American
products with impunity.9°
CONCLUSION
It is essential that OFAC officials recognize the strong Executive
and Congressional commitments to strengthening intellectual
property rights throughout the world, even in countries where the
United States may have long term or temporary national security
or foreign policy concerns. Otherwise, OFAC's careless and cavalier
conduct in denying a general license for intellectual property
transactions in future embargoes may result in the creation of a
counterfeiters' paradise. It is entirely against the interests of the
United States to set the stage where trademark counterfeiters,
copyright pirates and patent infringers may adopt American
intellectual property in an embargoed country without any
apprehension that the genuine owner can legally enforce any rights
against them. Essentially, OFAC should keep its hands off
American intellectual property rights.
Hearings on H.R. 927 Before the Subcomm. on Trade, House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 104th Cong. (1995) (prepared statement of John S. Kavulich, President of the U.S.
Cuba Trade and Economic Council, Inc.). Discussing the need to ensure the unfettered
ability to protect intellectual property rights in Cuba, Mr. Kavulich rightly observed that
"[n]o one wishes a repeat of events in today's Republic of South Africa where, among other
companies, McDonald's, Toys 'R' Us, and Victoria's Secret lost the rights to their trademarks
and must now incur hundreds of thousands of dollars in court-related costs." Id, Due to the
previous embargo against South Africa, many American businesses were barred from
exporting their products or services to South Africa, thereby making it difficult to satisfy the
trademark use requirements under South African trademark law. See Ron Wheeldon, South
Africa: The McDonald's Decision - Right or Wrong, TRADEMARK WORLD, Nov. 1995, at 14-16.
This development made it very inviting to South African businesses to adopt some of the
United States' most famous trademarks. Id. See also South African Firm Fights McDonald's
8, World Intell. Prop. Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 183 (June 1994).
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